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LONG BEACH EARTHQUAKE
· and'
PROTECTION AGAI~IDT FUTURE EARTHQUAICES
Immediately after the Long B~ach earthquake of
March 10, 1933, committees of several technical
societies and other interested bodies in southern
California cOUL."D.enced investigations to determine the
effect of the earthquake, the reasons for the large loss
of life and severe property damage, and the steps Which
should be taken to minimize the effects of future earth-
quakes.
Necessity for correlation of the efforts of the
various investigating groups was soon recognized, and
a permanent general committee known as "Joint Technical
Committee on Earthquake Protection" was formed under the
chairmanship of Dr. Robert A. lIillikan of California
Institute of Technology.
Al though rnany months will be required to complete
the detailed investigations now being carried on by
these organizations, the essential conclusions as to
what ha.ppened, Why it happened, and what should be done
to prevent loss of life and property in the future are
now knovm. In order that this information may be
available to the public in general and to governing
officials in particular, this summary is presented in
advance by the Joint Technical committee on Earthquake
Protection.
Due to the nature of this report, the Committee
has generally restricted itself to consideration of
the earthquake hazard in the densely populated coastal
region of which ios AnGeles is the economic center,
although most of its conclusions and recommendations
are applicable to all of California and to all other
parts of the Paoifib Southwest.
In their natural order, the work of the committee
will consist in correlation of investigations already
made or now being carried on, as to
(a) The general seismic activity of this part of
the continent; the geology of southern California with
particular reference to the location and activity of
fault zones; the location and character of areas of
deep alluvium; the extent of areas where groundwater is
close to the surface; and the occurrence of adverse
foundation materials for structures.
(b) The relation between the geOGraphic distribution
of damage relative to the epicenter of the earthquake
and the geologic and foundation charaeteristics of the
particular area; the relation between types of
structures and the extent of d£l.11lage in areas subjected
to like intensity of shock, with special consideration
to particular causes of loss of life.
(c) The minimum intensity and duration of earthquakes
to be anticipated in all provisions fo~ earthquake
protection.
(d) The minimum horizontal force which should be
provided for in structures in all parts of this region,
and which should properly be covered by legally adopted
building codes, together with the amount of additional
horizontal force 'Which should be considered "in the
design and construction of public bUildings and other
structures where large numbers of people congregate;
and likewise the additional horizontal and other forces
which should be provided for in the design and
construction of all types of structures located in
areas subject to special hazard.
(e) The degree to which existing structures of
public assembly, particularly schools, should be
strengthened in order to insure against loss of life
in event of an earthquake of the intensity and duration
to be expected.
(f) Heans whereby a conflagration resulting from an
earthquake may be avoided.
The final report of the .Toint Technical Committee
on Earthquake Protection will include a general review
of the detailed technical reports on the Long Beach
earthquake which are to be presented by the various
scientific, technical, and construction groups, and thus
it will be much more detailed and more technical in its
nature than this preliminary report. However, it is
believed that this summary will afford the people of
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Los Angeles and other communities a sound basis for
the correction of weaknesses in existing structures
and for the construction of new buildings and other
works in regions of seismic activity.
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GEOLOGICAL AND SEISMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Earthquakes are a phenomena of common occurr~nce in
many parts of the world. In certain localities seismic
disturbances originate from volcanic action but more
generally as a result of nature's process of continent
building. While in some other parts of the world,
earthquakes are accompanied more or less habitually by
tidal waves, following none of the many earthquakes
along the California coast has there been any serious
disturbance of the sea, with the possible, but dOUbtful,
exception of a small wave following the very severe
earthquake of 1812.
Other earthquakes originating on any of the
numerous fault zones in California and other parts of
the Paci'fic Southwest are to be expected from time to
time. These may well occur close enough to populated
areas to make it imperative that consideration be given
to the extent of the seismic hazard and to means of
minimizing loss of life and damage to property.
Fault Structure
Nearly all earthquakes are caused by the slipping
of one crustal block past another along a dividing
fracture or fault. In southern California the region
from the Mojave Desert to beyond the off-shore islands
is traversed by a series of active faults. 'rhese extend
from a few tens to many hundreds of miles in length
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and the trend is generally between north and west;
however, they are only roughly parallel and in certain
instances a major fault divides into two or more well
defined fault zones. In general these faults are from
five to twenty miles apart and apparently extend to
depths of fifteen or more miles below the surface of the
earth.
From northeast to southwest they are the San Andreas,
San Jacinto, San Gabriel, Sierra Madre, Raymond, Whittier-
Elsinore, and Inglewood, with several ~named faults
off-shore. The structure of southern California hence
consists of a series of northwestward-trending blocks
or crustal slices five to twenty-five miles wide, fifteen
or twenty miles thick, and tens to hundreds of miles in
length. Since the faults are not parallel, these great
blocks or slices are often shaped like a wedge.
Prehistoric Earthquakes
Earthquakes have occurred in California for a long
period in the geologic past and it is extremely probable
therefore that they will recur from time to time in the
future. Their occurence in prehistoric times is attested
by the bodies of crushed and pulverized rock found along
the active faults, resulting from the grinding during
numerous pre',::'ous movements; by the off set of geological
formations and the uplift of mountain blocks, indicating
total displacements explicable only by many repeated
-6-
slips and consequent earthquakes; by the distorted
topography and structure along the faults, and by
streams offset horizontally or vertically.
Historical Earthquakes
The historical record likewise testifies to the
continuance of such movements which from time to time
produce earthquakes. In the southern coastal section
shocks of large magnitUde were recorded in 1769, in
1812, and in 1857, and other very severe earthquakes
have occurred in the northern part of the state and in
the desert regions to the east. In addition to the three
major shocks in this region, several scores of earthquakes
of locally destructive intensity have occurred. In some
cases these shocks of moderate magnitude severely damaged
property and caused some loss of life but fortunately,
in many cases, th8 center of the earthquake was in a
very sparsely settled region.
The Long Beach earthquake of March 10, 1933 was
one of only moderate magnitude as compared with other
shocks which have occurred in California and in other
parts of the world. Its origin was beneath the sea
about four miles southwest of Newport Beach and it was
caused by a slip on a submarine fault, presumably on a
fracture along the southern extension of the Inglewood
fault zone.
Future Earthquakes
It is not possible to make definite predictions
as to either the time at which an earthquake will occur
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or as to the intensity and duration of a future shock.
~bile the geological record extends over a very great
length of time, the historical record covers only two
centuries. It is certain, however, from the continuous
records at the seismographic stations in Southern
California and other areas, that this region is
seismically very active.
The three most sevelBshocks which have occured
in the Southern portion of this State were not of as
great magnitude as earthquakes that have occured in
the Orient, in Southern Europe, in South America, and
even in the Central and Eastern parts of the United States.
These earthquakes of historical record, however, were
much greater in intensity and would have caused much
greater damage than the Long Beach earthquake, and it
is not improbable that an even stronger earthquake may
occur some time in the future.
Variations in Risk
Contrary to popular conception, the hazard of
destruction by an earthquake is not limited to the area
along a fault. Actually, the earthquake risk in Southern
California varies somewhat from place to place but does
not differ greatly. Instead of the destructiveness of a
shock being greatest close to a fault upon which a slip
occurs, very commonly the damage is greater at some
localities located much further away from the origin of
the earthquake. It is also clear that a violent disturb-
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ance on anyone of several more distant faults may affect
a locality more seriously than a less vigorous disturbance
on a nearby fault.
In this region there are a number of geological
peculiarities which greatly influence the intensity of
an earthquake in any particular area. The Tertiary
sedimentary rocks, which overlie the granitic bedrock or
basement complex, range in thickness from zero to 30,000
feet or more. Where the thickness of these sedimentary
depos.its is greatest, the violence of shaking in a given
shock will be most intense. Probably the most important
factor affecting variations in risk is the thickness and
the character of the recently deposited and relatively
uncompacted alluvium; the thicker these deposits and the
finer the grains of the material, the more subject it is
to the development of large and destructive secondary
waves during an earthquake. Similar intensification of
an earthquake shock occurs where the groundwater is close
to the surface and conversely the dryer the sub-soil the
more stable will be the ground during a shock. Another
variable element is the presumable but unpredictable
occurence in any earthquake of nodal and anti-nodal
points at which surface vibrations produced by the
earthquake reinforce or cancel each other.
Consequently, there are mGny factors which tend to
produce very irregular geographic differences in
destructive effects. In general it must be considered
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that the risk of damage during an earthquake does not differ
greatly throughout this entire region, even though
there was marked variation in the degree of destruction
at different localities during the Long Beach earthquake.
The general risk from future shocks determined by
variable combinations of these factors, including the
location of the particular fault on which the disturb-
ance may occur and the position of the epicenter on that
fault, the intensity of the shock and its duration, the
underlying rock formations, the depth and fineness of the
alluvium, the diste.nce to water, and possible nodal points,
is so uniform that there is little justification for
consideration of variations excepting where there is an
unusually unfavorable combination of risk factors. On
'the other hand, when considerable freedom of choice
exists as between sites and the construGtion of a building
or other structure embodying in one case a combination
of favorable factors and in the other an unfavorable set,
it would seem desirable to exercise that choice.
Protection Required
There is reasonable probability, if not virtual certainty,
that at some time in the future an earthquake of destructive
intensity will originate on a fault sufficiently'close to
a center of population to cause great loss of life and
damage to property, unless adequate protective measures
are carried out. The fault structure of the region, its
geological and historical earthquake record, are evidence
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of the possibility of the occurrence at any time of a
shock of not less strength nor of less duration than
the San Francisco earthquake of 1906. Any locality may
be subjected to that intensity of shock either by a
moderate earthquake on a nearby fault or by an earth-
quake of greater magnitude originating on a more distant
fault.
The destruction experienced in the San Jacinto
earthquake of 1899, in the San Francisco earthquake of
1906, in the Inglewood earthquake of' 1920, in the Sonta
Barbara earthquake of 1925, and in the Long Beach earth-
quake of this year - not to mention certain earlier and
other loss well-known disturb£ffices - should be sufficient
warning, especially when almost no community in this
entire region is many miles from an active fault. Even
though local geological and other conditions appear
favorable, a heavy shock originating on a fault at some
distance might well be destructive to any bUilding or
other structure which has not been designed and constructed
to be earthquake resistant.
Summary
Certain fundamental conclusions are evidenced by
years of geological and seismological investigations in
California and other parts of the Pacific Southwest.
(a) Earthquakes of damaging or destructive intensity
will continue to occur in California frorJ time. to time
in the future.
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(b) An earthquake of the intensity and duration
of the San Francisco earthquake of 1906 must be
anticipated in this region.
(c) The risk of damage or destruction of bUildings
and other structures, and attendant loss of life, varies
somewhat but not greatly throughout this region.
(d) The degree of risk is such that earthquake
resistant construction is absolutely necessary in this
region in order to avoid great loss of life and heavy
damage to property.
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EFFEOT OF LONG BEAOH EARTHQUAKE
At 5:54 in the afternoon of March 10, 1933, an
earthquake of moderate magnitude caused severe loss of
life and heavy property damage in Long Beach and
neighboring communities. This earthquake should not
have been unexpected, for it was typical of many others
which have occurred in Oalifornta and other parts of the
Pacific Southwest and there was ample reason to have
anticipated a slip along anyone of the numerous faults
which traverse this region. Nor should the resulting
damage have been unexpected, for almost no provision
had been illude in the design and construction of build-
ings and other structures to resist such seismic shocks.
Areus Affected
Seismographic records indicate thut the epicenter
of the earthquake of Murch lOth was several miles off
shore from Newport Beuch on the Inglewood Fault.
Although the center of the shock was thus about fifteen
miles southeast of Long Beach, severe damage occurred
almost as fur northwest as Inglewood, and equal de-
struction occurred in areqs more than ten miles laterally
from the fault and generally in a zone severnl miles
in width.
Had there been no differences in the geological
character of the region, zones of equal intensity of
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shock and of approximately like damage would have been
somewhat elliptical in shape, extending further along
the fault ~one thp.~ lnterally. However, material
differences do exist, principally in the form of deep
alluVial basins and areas where groundwater is
relatively close to the surface.
The combination of these adverse faotors largely
accounts for the severity of damage in Oompton, Hunting-
ton Park, and numerous other communities located
northeast of the Inglewood Fault in the alluvial filled
valley which form the coastal plain. In contra-distinction,
there were other are~s, such as Laguna 3each and a large
part of San Pedro, where bedrock is close to the surface
of the ground, which suffered comparntively little
damage although ~s near to the center of the shock.
In Long Beach there \vas markedly more damage in those
sections where the alluvium was deep and saturated than
in the Signal Hill section, although the latter is
closer to the actual trace of the fault upon which the
slip occurred.
In general, the zone of severe damage extended
longitudinally from Seal Beach almost ot Inglewood and
from the ocean to a general line through Huntington
Park and S8nta Ana, vdth the greatest destruction in
Long Beach and Oompton. Southwesterly of the fault
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zone~oderQte ~~m~ge occurred in San Pedro and in the
area north of the Palos Verdes Hills, but the effect was
slight elsewhere. iJortheasterly of the Inglewood Fault,
however, the zone of 20derate da~age was more extensive,
in that it included the business district and the
southern lJart of the Oi ty of Los ..A.ngeles and ;:.:ost of
the to~~s located on the co~stal plain in Los Angeles
and Orange Oounties.
Damage to Structures
In zones of equal intensity of shock there waS
Wiele variance in the degree of da:.:13.ge to structures.
Oertain types of bUildings were cO~(lpar,J.tively little
affected, while other types generally suffered greater
proportional d~~~ge; so~e ~aterial8 of construction
see~ed to withst~nd the shock f~r better th2n others;
however, the essenti~l distinctions wera largely ~atters
of inherent stability and attention to detail.
Do..:Jage to 'i)uildings of the sa.Z:ie soneral type differ-
ed widely, depending upon the intensity of the shocks;
further;:lore, the rela.tiol1 between t~1e extent of da:.1I.1ge to
structures of different types ·,1as far fro:1 consta.nt.
In 80::18 areas sUbj ected to ::lOderQ,te s:.lOck Q, cOl.1binatiOl1
of circu;;,stances peculiarly unfavorable to high
skeleton fro..~e buildings apparently developed,
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al though 10\'7 bearing wall structures in the sa:Je areas
were little affected. On the other hand, in localities
where the intensities were greater, the latter class
of structures suffered ~uch more proportional damuge.
liost of the modern office buildings in the zone
of severe damase were of fire-proofed skeleton frame
construction, and these buildings suffered little or
no da~age other than to filler walls and partitions.
Other major bUildings of the Ba~e type of construction,
but somewhat discontinuous in form and thus with less
inherent rigidity, were injured nore severely and there
were extre:::ie instaY1CeS of serious damage. ·;ihile
conj ectural, the da:.kl.ge to such bUildings - built al:':lOst
Without regard for earthquake forces - would very
probably have iJeen·~Juch ::lore serious and extensive had
theearthquake been one of the intensity and duration
to be anticluated
..
Although very little damage was done to bUildings
of the bearing wall type in areas where the shock was
not intense, the characteristic degree of injury to
this type of structure rapidly ~ounted toward the center
of severest da:Jage, and throughout the areas subj ected
to intense shock these bUildings were generally
incapable of resisting the force of the earthquake.
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Had the Long Beach earthquake been of greater intensity,
or of equal intensity over a larger ~rea, damage to
bUildings of the bearing wall type would almost certainly
have been widespread, and total collapse would have been
of frequent occurrence.
Only general oention need be ~~de of an all too
prevalent class of construction in this region; namely,
the stores [wd apart:Jent houses \7hich YJere built as
cheaply as inadequate bUilding codes would permit by those
Dho were interested only in speculative profits. In the
outlying'sections of the major cities and generally
throughout the suall towns in the zone of severe chmage,
hundreds of SUCll eX~;:lples of tli'lsound ~Juilcling construction
were wrecked, and as a class they account for a large
part of the toll of property damage.
~nile a great many of the residences in the affected
area were like~7ise built to sell, they 'were aLlost
universally of ~ood-frame construction. A certain amount
of diagonal bracing is unaVOidable in the erection of a
wood-frame structure, and the weight of the bUilding is
s::,lall, consequentlY the inherent stability of single
far:lily residences is high. Except i7here the foundation
walls ~ere not carried up to the floor level and the
underpinning was not braced, injury to this type of
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structure was largely limited to cracked plaster, to tile
roofs, arid to brick chimneys.
Electric power service was interrupted only a few
minutes even in the zone of severe damage, excepting for
a small part of Signal Hill where the power was off for
more than an hour. However, gas was not distributed
throughout Long Beach and other areas for a number of
days; and there were some breaks in domestic water supply
systems. Industrial plants of modern framed construction
were not damaged seveniy, except in the case of certain
plants located in what had been swampy areas and in others
where heavy machinery was installed at a considerable
height above the foundations without adequate diagonal
brac~~g. Oil tanks were rarely damaged, except for the
roofs on many large tanks. Oil pipe lines and other
pipe lines were not generally affected, except in limited
areas where displacement of the ground surface occurred.
A few water towers were thrown down, but most of the
damage to this type of structure consisted in distortion
of supporting members. Docks and other harbor works
supported on piles were generally displaced to some
extent, and the level of fills behind bulkheads was lowered.
Highways and bridges were substantially undamaged,
except where built on fills across marshy or soft ground
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Damage to Schools
More significant than the damage to commercial
bUildings, residences, and other types of structures,
was the exposure of the general weakness of the schools
in which the children of all families congregate each
day. In Long Beach, in Compton, in Huntington Park -
in fact in every community where the earthquake was at all
intense - severe damage to school buildings was general.
Auditoriums collapsed, walls were thrown down, and the
very exits to safety were piled high with debris which
~ few moments before had been heavy parts of towers and
ornamental entrances. It is sufficient to suggest the
terrible consequences, had the same earthquake occurred
a few hours earlier.
Faced with the necessity of providing space to
take care of the tremendous increase in number of school
children during the past fifteen years, desirous that
such buildings should "be attract.j.ve, and subject to
a public opinion uninformed as to earthquake risk,
Boards of Education were eVidently most concerned with
the size of the school buildings and their appearance.
Actual or assumed financial limitations prevented the
selection of the best type of construction, and legal
requirements forced the letting of contracts to the
lowest bidder who could secure bond. It is eV~dent that
this point of view is unsound and the economy false.
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Loss of Life;
At 5~45 in the afternoon the school bUildings were
fortunately empty of children, and most of the c,dult
persons in the area were at home. In spite of this,
approximately one .hundred and twenty peoplE~ were killed
outright ar died of injuries, and many more were severely
hurt. ~9 precise estimate can be made, but it is
"
clear that a very large proportion o~ the total deaths
and injuries resulted from debris falling on people
who were in the streets at the time, or who ran out
into the streets at the first shock.
Much of this debris consisted of bricks from parapet
walls; poorly supported cornices contributed to the
mass of falling objects; and front walls of shops toppled
off of their girder supports and crushed anything
beneath. Occasional injuries and a few deaths occurred
in residential areas, generally due to collapse of
chimneys. Loss of life or severe injury to persons in
well constructed bUildings was very limited, if not
entirely absent.
Necessary Conclusions:
Analysis of the effect of the earthquake of March 10}
1933 leads ineVitably to the conclusion that;
(a) Damage to bUildings and other structures and loss
of life and injury to persons are not restricted to a
narrow strip along a fault zone.
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(b) Structures built on soft ground or in areas of deep
alluvium, are adversely affected.
(c) In the areas subjected to intense shock, fire-
proof skeleton-frame buildings sufferer~~ less propor-
tional damage than bUildings of the bearing wall type.
(d) Well braced wood-frame residences were particularly
resistant to the shock, except for the collapse of
chimneys.
(e) All types of structures where cheapness had been
the governing factor suffered severely.
(f) School buildings were generally unable to resist
the force of the earthquake where the shocks were at
all intense, and all similarly constructed school build-
ings must be considered incapable of resisting an
earthquake of destrictuve intensity.
(g) Loss of life was much less than would have been the
case if the earthquake had occurred a few hours earlier.
Such loss of life and injury to persons as did occur
was due largely to falling debris, particularly from
fire walls, cornices, and other ornamentation, and from
the outward colla pse of poorly supported masonry, tile
and brick walls.
(h) ~ll bUildings should be and school buildings must
be so re-designed and strengthened that a repetition of
the recent disaster can not take place.
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STAh~ARDS FOR DES!GN OF STRUCTURES
An earthquake of the intensity and duration of
the one which did so much danage in San Francisco and
neighboring communities in April 1906 may occur at any
time in the future in any part of the Pacifio southwest.
Damage to buildings and other structures in San Francisco,
in Santa Barbara, and in Long Beach, and similar destruc-
tive effects during earthquakes which have occured in
other parts of this country and foreign countries, is
ample evidence that designs which do not include
allowanoe against forces produced by earthquakes are
not satisfactory.
AnY structure is subjected to abnormal stress
during an earthquake, and unless special provision is
made in the design, partial failure or complete destruc-
tion may TIell result. The forces resulting from a
shock are extremely complex; furthermore, the problem is
a dynamic one in that the direction of these forces
repeatedly changes during an earthquake. AnY attempt,
however, to measure the dynamic forces involved and to
consider a structure as a vibrating unit has been found
to be generally impracticable.
In this connection, .Tohn R. Freenan, 1~'ho was one
of the greatest students of the problem, stated:
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"Just as 24 years ago I concluded that ~he
behavior of the flat arch in the ancient
Church of San Dooingo at Panama told a more
credible story about absence of violent
earthquakes on the Isthmus by its survival
of more than 200 years, than could be found
in the monographs of geologists, so I now
conclude that the almost Derfect resistance
to the violent Japanese earthquake of
September 1, 1923, by oany tall, carefully
bUilt, rigid office bUildings, warehouses,
etc 9 , in Tokyo, \"7hich had been designed to
every~here resist a horizontal force equal
to 10 per cent of the superincumbent r:eight
at each floor-level (or l/lOth the acceler-
ation due gravity), and considering that
this successful resistance was against far
greater earthauake forces than those of
Charleston, San Francisco and Santa Barbara
or any other of which we have evidence in
the United states, gives an ample basis for
trusting to •••• safe and simple rules,
particularly in the United States and Canada."
This is also endorsed by prof. suyehiro, an out-
standing Japanese authority, who stated in reference
to the Tokyo earthquake:
nAs a pI'eCltical problem, the actual fact that
buildings designed under 'the O.lg basis'
resisted this earthquake fairly well is a
datum more valuable than any other arguments."
Acceleration of Earthquakes
It is generally recognized that the acceleration
of a destructive earthquake has never been measured
with tolerable accuracy anyrmere within the zone of
severe damage. However, it is probable that the
acceleration during the San Francisco earthquake was
in some places as high as 40 per cent of gravity, and
that over a large part of the area the acceleration
approximated at least one-tenth gravity. During the
Santa Barbara and Long Beach earthquake, ~hich were
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sUbstantially of the same intensity, an accele~ation
of ahout 20 per cent gravity occurred in a few
localities, but in general the intensity was probably
less than one-tenth gravity. The Tokyo earthquake, on
the other hand, was of considerably greater intensity
than that in San Francisco.
The sensible duration of the Son Francisco earthquake
was about one minute, that in Tokyo was several minutes,
while the larger shocks in Long Beach earthquake lasted
only thirteen seconds.
In order that an earthquake of the intensity and
duration of that which occurred in San Francisco in
1906 might be resisted by buildings and other structures,
it is evident that an acceleration equal to one-tenth
of that due to gravity must be assumed in the design of
such structures. Following the simple rule ~hich has
been found to be applicable, the forces produced by the
earthquake may properly be considered as a horizontal
force applied against any bUilding equal to one-tenth the
superincunbent weight above the point application of
the force.
This rule is likewise applicable to alnost any
other type of structure, although in the case of masonry
dams and other structures which tend to slide, and under
certain adverse conditions, special consideration should
be given to vertical acceleration opposing gravity. In
general, however, intelligent application of the "0.1
gravity rule" will result in a safe structure.
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Allowable stresses and Lond Reductions
In ~apan, as a result of experience gained in
the Tokyo earthquake and other severe earthQuake, the
factor of one-tenth gravity has been generally applied,
and no increase in ~orking stresses in the materials
is allowed, nor is any reduction made in the live load
which is, of course, a part of the superincumbent weight.
In Italy the likelihood of severe earthquakes more
nearly approximates conditions in ~apan, and the design
requirements are of substantially the sarle character.
In New Zealand the same acceleration or horizontal
force is assUQed, but the hazard being considered less
than in Japan, momentary increase in the \!orking stresses
of materials is permitted.
The chance of an earthquake in this region of the
intensity and duration of that TIhich occurred in Tokyo
is believed small enough to warrant momentary increase
in the unit stresses and the assumption of reduced live
loads.
Aside from lateral pressure due to wind, substantially
all esisting buildings and other structures were designed
to support the wright of the building and other loads
~hich were assumed to act only in vertical planes. It
is usual in such designs against vertical loads to
provide a factor of safety of three or four; that is,
the stress in colunills and in other structural members
is not permitted to be more than about one-third of that
which would cause failure. consequently, when horizontal
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forces are considered as b~ing applied to the structure
over a short period of time, it is reasonable that the
unit stress in the various members should be increased
by one-third.
It must be recognized, however, that a horizontal
force equal to one-tenth the superincumbent weight will
increase the uriit stress in many parts of the structure
far more than one-third, unless special provision has
been made in the design.
Live loads, that is, any load or weight other than
the actual weight of the structure itself, are generally
based upon the maximum condition which may occur. In
warehouses the live load frequently is as great as
assumed in normal design of such bUildings, but in
office bUildings, stores, theaters, and schools, only
extreme congestion of persons would produce the loads
assumed in ordinary design. The likelihood of all
parts of such bUildings being loaded to a maximum
simultaneously is naturally remote; consequently, in
considering the resistance against earthquake shock in
this region, it is entirely proper that the maximum
live loads should be reduced by one-fourth to one-half.
Distribution of Forces
Irrespective of the direction in which a force is
exerted against a structure, generally it must be carried
vertically downward to the foundation. On this account
the vertical supporting members, particularly the
columns and walls, must be so designed,as to resist
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the bending produced by the horizontal f~rce resulting
from an earthquake. In order that such horizontal forces
may be transmitted to the vertical members capable of
taking this force, all connections must be capable of
resisting the shearing stresses involved, and each floor,
roof, or other horizontal system nmst be made rigid by
proper diagonal bracing or by other means.
Where structures are built on loosely consolidated
material, or when they are supported on piles or cais'sons,
the foundations should likewise be inter-connected, so as
to resist horizontal movement.
Complexity of Design
In its primary elements, the design of a new
structure to resist forces produced by an earthquake,
and the analysis of the ability of an existing structure
to resist such forces, consist in the determination of:
(a) Strength and physical pr0perties of the
materials of construction;
(b) The total weight above each floor or other level;
(c) The distribution of the horizontal forces -
expressed as a percentage of the superincumbent weight -
to the walls and columns supporting the structure in
proportion to the relative stiffness of these members;
Cd) The combined stress due to vertical and horizontDl
loads in each member with consideration of the torsional
effects where the applied force is not coincident with
the resisting member;
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(e) The details of connections between members
necessary to knit the entire structure into a homo-
geneous unit.
Recommended Standards
Except for certain special types of construction,
such as well braced, wood fram residences, it is
recommended that all existing buildings be brought up
to the following standards, and that in the design of
all new buildings the following should be considered the
minimum standards:
{gl Horizontal Forces
In the design of'buildings, and all other types
of structures which extend above the surface of the
ground, a horizontal force of at least one-tenth that
due to gravity, that is, one-tenth of the super-
incumbent weight, should be assumed.
Special structures and parts of structures, such
as tanks, towers, chimneys, smokestacks, pent houses,
etc., should be designed to resist a horizontal force
of not less than one-fifth of their weight.
All fire walls, parapet walls, and other similar
walls, and all exterior ornaments and appendages,
should be designed to resist a horizontal force equal
to the full weight of such walls, ornaments, or
appendages.
iQ) Live Loads
The live loads to be used in designs for ~arth­
quake protection should be not less than one-half the
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live loads used in design of buildings, bridges,
and other structures for vertical forces, except
that no reduction in live load should be made in
the case of warehouses and other structures normally
sUbjected to full live loads.
~~ Combined Stresses
The combined stresses due to vertical and
horizontal forces should not exceed by more than
one-third the maximum unit stress allowed in designs
for vertical forces only. Such combined stress
should in no case be more than 50 per cent of the
ultimate strength of any material of construction
in compression, tension) or shear.
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STRENGTHENING OF EXISTING BUILDINGS
In several foreign. countries, espeoially in Japan,
Italy, and New Zealand, standards of design have been
adopted with respect to buildings which render all new
bUildings resistant to earthquake shocks. In this
country, but slight oonsideration has been given to the
speoial problem of design against earthquake shooks.
Palo Alto and Santa Barbara were the only cities - until
very recently - which had adopted adequate standards;
however, this was only after a destructive earthquake in
each case.
Any bUilding code adopted as part of the law of any
community is applicable to all new construction, but
perhaps such laws cannot be made retroactive. This
situation is of tremendous importance for the number of
bUildings already existing is many times the number to
be built during the next ten or twenty years. Presumably,
~s such buildings become obsolescent they will gradually
be replaoed by new struotures built according to proper
standards, but it must be recognized that there will be
the continued hazaxd of partial or total destruction of
thousands of privately owned buildings in California and
other parts of the Pacific Southwest. Oorrection of this
condition by the strengthening of all privately owned
bUildings will be largely at the volition of the owner.
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However, much cnn be done under the police power of each
co~nunity to elimin~te aotual hazards to life.
Suoh legGl restriotions on the retroactivity of
laws, however, do not apply to eXisting publio buildings.
Many suoh buildings would be unable to withstand an
earthquake of even the intensity of that whioh occurred
in Long Beaoh on March 10, 1933, and would almost
oertainly be greatly danaged, if not entirely destroyed,
in an earthquake of the intensity and duration of 'that
which oocurred in San Francisco in April 1906.
A large proportion of the total investment in pUblic
buildings is in the schools. In Oalifornia the increase
in population was extremely rapid during the past fifteen
years and neoessarily there was a great expansion in
sohool faoilities on that aooount alone. In addition,
the tendenoy toward an expanding currioulum was greatest
during the arone period, with the result th~t the capital
investment in school buildings ~t the present time
avernges alnost $50 per capita throughout this state and
is more in the metropolitan oenters. The weakness of
most school buildings has been demonstrated beyond
question by the failure of a large proportion of suoh
bUildings to resist the earthquake in Long Beach and
neighboring oon~lunities. To make all sohools and other
public buildings safe in event of an earthquake will
involve the expenditure Of large s~~s.
Basis of Original Designs
Practioally all bUildings have heretofore bean
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designed and constructed to resist only the vertical
forces produced by the weight of the bUilding itself
and the other vertical loads which might be brought to
bear. As evidenced by the destruction to such buildings
in every earthquake of magnitude, this practice has
resulted in structures incapable of withstanding even
relatively slight horizontal forces.
School buildings, in particular, suffered excessive
damage in the Long Beach earthquake, due primarily to
the fact that most of these buildings were so built and
the materials of construction were such that horizontal
forces could not be resisted, and secondarily to the
character of such buildings which normally were provided
with high ceilings and large rooms, with the wall area
greatly reduced by large windows·
It is not to be presumed, however, that buildings
of the same arohitectural form cannot be made to withstand
earthquake foroes, nor is it to be preSUllled that existing
buildings of this type cannot be strengthened in most
oases so as to be reasonably safe in event of a severe
earthquake. The problem, however, is oomplex and a high
order of teohnical design and exeoution will be required.
Analysis of Present Condition
Before any plan for strengthening any public bUilding
can be considered, it Will, of course, be necessary in each
case to analyze the struoture as it Was origin~ly designed
and constructed. While it may be assumed that in general
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such buildings, particularly school buildings, are
deficient in strength, nevertheless the degree to which
the structure fails to meet the standards of construc-
tion of new earthqual{e-resistant buildings must be as-
certained. This naturally involves complete analysis
of the stresses which would develop in the structure and
examination of the material of which the building is built.
Plans for Strengthening
When a building has been found to lack in any par-
ticular the strength to resist the forces 1\!hich act dur-
ing an earthquake, proper modification of the structure
must then be made the basis of special study, unless the
building is found to be so weak as to justify its demo-
lition. No general formula or method of attack can be
set up, because each structure wi.ll, in a large degree,
be a separatE.; problem. The same standards of design,
however, should be applied as in the case of new buildings
constructed to resist an earthquQke of the intensity and
duration to be anticipated in this region.
The mini.mum standard of re-design should include an
allowance for horizontal forces equal to one-tenth of the
superincumbent 1rwight above any level without an increase
in unit stresses of more than one-third in excess of those
normally used in the design for vertical loads. The
same requirements as to bracing in horizontal plances and
as to inter-connection of footings should apply in the
case of strengthening of existing buildings as for new
structures designed to resist earthquako forces.
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Personnel
In some instances the technical staff of a public
governing body may be able to analyze the condition of
existing schools or other public buildings and to design
and supervise the vvork of strengthening these buildings.
In most cases, however, a fully qualified staff will not
be available and recourse will of necessity be to pro-
fessional men in private practice.
The situation regarding schools is so serious and
the responsibility of each board of education or school
trustees is so definite that there should be no delay in
providing for the safety of children and others in every
school in this entire region. In order that a high
degree of competence shall prevail in the analysis of
these buildings c:mel in the design of new work for
strengthening, each school board should engage the ser-
vices of only those ','Tho are especially qualified to
pass upon the safety of the site, to make the structural
analysis, and to work out the architectural mod.ifications.
In the selection of technical specialists, each school
board or other pUblic body should be advised by the
representative technical organizations.
Costs
No general estimate can be made of the cost of
strengthening existing private buildings as the amount
of new construction will vary widely in individual cases.
Major buildings, such as fire-proofed skeleton frame
office bUi,ldings can be made rC3.sonably safe against
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damage during earthquakes at a smaller proportion of
their original cost of construction than buildings of
the bearing wall type which have no supporting skeleton
frames. However, the latter class of structures repre-
sents a much smaller investment in individual cases.
Public buildings, however, may be considered as a
group in most communities. Variations in cost of
strengthening incHvidual structures will tend to com-
pensate so that a general approximation can properly
be made. In rare cases the cost of strengthening school
buildings "(viII be less than 10 per cent of the first
cost. In most cases, however, an expenditure equal to
15 per cent to 30 per cent of the original cost of these
buildings probablyvvill be required in order that the
safety of children in the schools can be assured. These
estimates, of course, do not apply to buildings which
were damaged to a high degree in the earthquake of
March 10, 1933. In some instances the cost of strength-
ening even undamaged bUildings will exceed 30 per cent
and the decision as to whether to strengthen a building
or abandon it umust then be made.
For the average urban community it may be assumed
that a sum equal to 25 per cent of the original cost of
all school buildings v:Till be required directly and indi-
rectly to make these buildings reasonably safe in event
of an earthquake. To the actual cost of all new work
and reconstruction must be added special costs of
investigation and in many cases a large sum for temporary
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housing of children. While the cost of school buildings
in California averages approximately $50 per capita, the
investment in such buildings in communities where major
structures are general, probably is closer to $60 per
capita; consequently it should be anticipated that about
$15 per capita may be required to meet the cost of making
the schools safe. In the aggregate, the expenditure
therefore will be large, but the question should be only
how can the necessary funds be provided.
Methods of Financing
All public works must be financed in one of two basic
methods, either by direct taxation with payment of costs
out of current revenues, or by borrowing the money to be
repaid out of future revenues. Under the laws of Cali-
fornia, all construction of school buildings, and alter-
ations, repairs, restoring, or rebuilding of any school
building, must be by one of these basic methods.
Only in rare cases would it be possible for a com-
plete program of rehabilitation of school buildings to be
met out of current tax revenues. While this policy of
"pay as you go" is desirable, it would probably involve
a large incrcas in school taxes in any case and in most
instances the necessary increase would be in excess of
the legal limit.
Consequently, borrowing the money through the issuance
of bonds must be faced by most communities. The public
which rightfully demands that school bUildings shall be
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made safe, must back their demand with the willingness
to bond the community for enough money to carry out the
proper program of rehabilitation.
Many school bUildings in a number of communities were
so seriously damaged in the earthquake of March 10, 1933,
that legal restrictions will prevent the issuance of bonds
in sufficient amount to rebuild these schools and to
strengthen others less seriously damaged. In this con-
nection, a new law hns been passed, which will permit the
State of California to obtain funds from the Federal Govern-
ment and to replace or reconstruct public school bUildings
in such areas. Under this law, the State can then rent
these new buildings or reconstructed buildings to such
school districts and receive back from the school districts
payment over a long period without it being necessary for
the school districts to increase their bonded indebtedness.
General financial conditions will dictate that in
most instances the necessary financing for school reCon-
struction should be obtained by the calling of an election
by the board of education or the school trustees for sub-
mission to the electors of the school district the question
of the issuance and sale of bonds. Such a procedure would,
of course, place the responsibility for strengthening the
schools and making them safe against damage during an earth-
quake squarely upon the public Whose children occupy these
schools.
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PREVENTION OF CONFLAGRATIONS
In the case of almost every e~rthquake, many fires
are started in buildings damaged by the shock. Fortunate-
ly, such fires did not get out of control in any of the
earthquakes which have caused partial destruction of build-
ings in Southern California cities. However, following
the earthquake of April 1906 in San Francisco, a confla-
gration developed which was not under control until the
damage from fire was perhaps ten times the damage direct-
ly resulting from that earthquake. In Tokyo in 1923, a
great fire swept over a large part of the city; the re-
sulting damage to property was far greater than that
directly caused by the earthquake, and in the fire tens
of thousands of people lost their lives.
An earthquake of tho intensity and duration of that
which occurred .in San Francisco in 1906 may occur at any
time at almost any place in this entire region. Unless
adequate provisions are made to minimize the damage to
buildings, it is a virtual certainty that a large number
of fires will develop throughout any community subjected
to such a shock. In order that such fires can be brought
under control promptly, the water system of the community,
the fire fighting equipment, and the organizati0n developed
to meet such emergencies must be capable of functioning
efficiently and without delay.
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BUilding Construction
It is of primary importance that all new building,s
be so designed and constructed as to be capable of with-
standing the shock of an earthquake of severe intensity,
and it is of equal importance that all existing structures
be strengthened so as to have like resistance to such an
earthquake. ~~en buildings in tho cities of the Pacific
Southwest have been made strong enough to withstand earth-
quake shocks, then the chance of serious fires will be
little more than the hazard continually present in any
congested area.
Should a fire develop in any building as result of
an earthquake, the spread of this fire to other areas
can best be prevented by bUilding construction which is
fire resistant.
The frames of bUildings should be fireproofed by
material which will not easily be broken or fractured.
Light wells, service shafts, and elevator shafts should
be protected by incombustible fire-resistant walls and
metal doors~ In congested districts, the use of metal
sash and wire glass or equivalent substitutes is highly
desirable, and it is important that window openings in
front of buildings sh~uld be protected as well as on the
side and in the rear of such buildings. Within such
buildings, combustible material should be limited as far
as practicable and wire glass rather than plain glass
should be used in corridors. Parapet and fire walls
intended to limit the spread of fire should, of course,
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be so built as to prevent their collapse.
'NateI' SUJmly and Other Utili tics
In Sun Francisco the water system was seriously affect-
ed by the e 'J.rthqu:lke and in many parts of the city water
~as not available with which to fight fires that developed.
This condition wus so serious th:J.t an elaborate system of
duplicato mains and distributing reservoirs has since been
provided in that city as insurance.
In Los Angeles, somewh3.t similar .p'rovisions have
been made. Furthermore, it is fully recognized that most
of the water supplying Los Angeles is brought from Owens
V'J.lley through an aqueduct vfhich crossos the San Andreas
rift and numerous othor f3.ults. While the hazard of
interruption is thus present, reserve stor3.ge has been
provided near the city in sufficient quantity to meot all
needs for several months.
In general, every city should be prOVided with a
supply of w:J.ter from different sources :md, where pumping
plants are required, duplicate sources of power should be
aVJ.ilable. In order thJ.t n:) '3.1'5° area might be isol3.ted
from all sources of supply, there should be ::1 number of
distributing reservoirs so located that eJ.ch section of
the city is in effoct supplied from a separate source.
In addition, all parts of the system should be inter-
connected at sever~l places with mains large enough to
permit the delivery of ~ater into any area by a number
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of routes. The entire distribution system should be
equipped with valves so located that any broken main
could be isolated and service continued through pipe
lines around the break.
Interruption to the delivery of gas is liable to
occur in event of an earthquake in approximately the
same degree that the water system is affected. Electric
lines are less subject to damage, except by falling debris.
In Southern California both gas and electricity are
obtained or could be obtained promptly from a number of
different sources, so that there is little liklihood
of an interruption longer than that deliberately created
in the interest of safety. Immediately following any
earthquake which results in damage to buildings~ the
supply of gas to the affected area should be cut off as
. a fire prevention measure, and all damaged electric lines
should likewise be put out of service until all danger
has been removed.
Fire Fighting Equipment:
In every community there is, of course, a fire
department equipped to fight fires which occur from
time to time. In order that such fire departments may
be able to prevent a conflagation following a severe earth-
quake, all equipment and personnel should be located
only in buildings which are especially resistant to
fire and earthquake shock. This is of particular
importance in the case of fire alarm headquarters and
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this bUilding should preferable be constructed in the
center of a large open area.
Had a number of serious fires developed in Long
Beach, a cbnflagation might well have followed, for the
fire department in that city was seriously handicapped
for some time on account of the partial destruction of
some of the fire stations and by failure of the fire
alarm system.
There should be in each fire district chemical
apparatus or motorized water tanks with boosters which
could be mobilized quickly in case of failure of 'any
part of the water system. F~ery fire department, except
in small cities, should include a corps of men especially
skilled in the handling and use of explosives.vvhen the
spread of a fire carulot be prevented by ordinary methods,
demolition of buildings is required" It has been found
that demolition was generally ineffective until directed
by those trained for this use of explosives"
Interior fire protection in individual buildings
vastly lessens the risk, whether sprinklers are supplied
by gravity from elevated water tanks or by pumping from
some source other than the water system of the community.
In order that this local water supply should be available
in case of necessity it is, of course, obvious that all
equipment must be prOVided with safeguards in case of
an earthquake and the water tanks must be capable of
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resisting lateral forces. Chemical estinguishers should
be abailable in numbers i.n every building so as to make
possible the immediate control of incipient fores.
Disaster plan
In Los Angeles and in many other large cities of
this country a major disaster plan has been work8d out
carefully and has been modified from time to time to meet
changed conditions. Such a plan, covering not only one
city but all neighboring communities, is of the grcates
importance. Full responsibility for the execution of a
definite, carefully organized plan of action should
automatically be vested in previously selected authorities
and this plan should be understood thoroughly by the
staffs of all fire and police departments, and by all
others whose cooperation would be adv~ntageous. While,
following the earthquake of March 10, the necessity did
not arise for putting into execution tho major disaster
plan, prompt and effective aid was rendered to Long Beach
and other communities by the Los Angeles Fire and Police
Departments.
Aside from other considerations of city planning,
it is desirable that there be many wide streets and large
open areas which would aid in the isolation of serious
fires.
Summary:
It must be recognizdd that earthquakes of more than
moderate magnitude may occur at any time in this region
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that a severe conflagation might follow such an earth-
quake, and that as a result the damage might be increased
ten-fold. It is theefore very important that:
(a) BUildings and other structures should be designed
and constructed or strengthened so as to be capable
of resisting earthquake forces.
(b) BUildings should be made as nearly fireproof as
practicable, and that all bUildings in congested eistricts
should be fire-resistant to a greater degree than is now
required.
(c) Fire departments should be especially equipped
and trained to combat a conflagation.
(d) A major disaster plan should be worked out in each
area with the same care and high degree of organizat on
as the plan which has been developed in Los Angeles
under the guidance of the Fire Department.
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
All of California ~~d other parts of the Pacific
Southwest are in a region of seismic activity. Earth-
quakes have occurred throughout the entire geological
history of this region, and the historical record of
two centurdes ~L filled with instances of earthquakes
of more than moderate intensity. The geological structure
of Southern California is characterized by numerous faults
upon which an earthquake may occur at any time. Parti-
cUlarly on the coastal plain where the greatest concent-
ration of population exists, there are large areas of
deep alluvium which intensify the shock of an earthquake.
Contrary to popular conception, the hazard of
damage by an earthquake is not restricted to a narrow
zone along a fault, but is generally uniform. An earth-
quake of locally destricuive force may occur on anyone of
the smaller faults close to any community, or a slip of
major proportions may take place on a more distant- fault
with equally disastrous effect. There can be no doubt
regarding the necessity of protection in this area against
an earthquake of the intensity and duration of that which
occurred in the San Francisco region in 1906.
In Long Beach and neighboring comlnunities there was
far too much damage as a result of that earthquake of
moderate intensity. The lessons which should have been
fixed indelibly in the minds of all by the destruction
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to buildings and other worl\:s in San :"~rancisco in 1906 ~
in Inglewood in 1920, in Santa Barbara in 1925, and in
other communities in California and else where in the
world, had been disregarded. Almost no buildings in this
region had been designed to resist earthquake ~orces, and
the poor quality of construction in many cases con-
tributed to the destruction. Ovor one hundred lives were;
lost by the collapse of walls, parapets, ffi1d by other
falling debris, substantially all of which should and
could have been prevented.
Damage to schools, which children are required
by law to attend, was widespread, and it was only by chance
that thousands of children were not killed. A great many
schools in this region which were undamaged in that
locally destructive earthquake are little better than vvhich
suffered so severely. No one can question the imperative
necessity of prompt and effective correction of the
weakness prevalent in the schools.
During an earthquake all structures are subjected
to shocks from all directions and of varying intensities.
Experience in cities where severe earthquakes have
occurred has let to the conclusion that reasonable
protection against earthquakes can be obtained, provided
that the bUilding ordher structure is properly designed
and constructed. In the design of buildings to resist an
earthquake of the intensity and duration to be anticipated
in this aegion, horizontal forces equal to one-tenth of
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...·116 superincumbent weight above each level must be
assumed as being applied in any direction. While more
rigid standards have been adopted in regions of greater
seismic hazard, it is believed that a momentary increase
of one-third in the unit stress of materials is
justified.
Compared to the large number of buildings which
now exist in this metropolitan center and in other
communities throughout the Pacific Southwest, relatively few
new buildings will be constructed during the next ten years;
consequently the necessity for steengthening existing
buildings is more important even than a change in the
standards for new bUildings. Insofar as the police power
of the State will permit, all privately owned
existing bUildings should be made earthquake resistant.
Strengthening of public buildings, however, is subject
to the will of the people, and there should be no delay
in making these buildings, particularly school buildings,
safe.
It is recognized that strengthening of all school
buildings so that they will be fully capable of resisting
the force of an earthquake of greater intensity and
duration that that which occurred in Long Beach will
require the expenditure of large sums of money. The
question, however, should be only that of how this money
can be best and most qUickly prOVided.
While there have been a number of earthquakes which
have not been followed by conflagation, the damage
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by fire in San Francisco was perh2ps ten times the dam~ge
which resulted directly from the earthquake, and in Tokyo
the conflagation which followed the earthquake of 1923
not only did tremendous damage to property, but caused the
loss of tens of thousands of lives. Fires are not liable
to start in buildings which are not damaged, and consequently
strengthening of buildings to resist earthquake shock is
a primarly factor in the prevention of conflagations. Proper
fire protection of buildings, particularly in congested
areas, is necessary to prevent the spread of fires. Water
sy;tems must be protected from damage a.s far as pt'acticable~
and other means of combating fire must be provided.
At some time in the future an earthquake of major
intensity will occur in this region, and unless existing
~vils are corrected by adequate protection against
earthquakes, disaster must follow. A carefully organized
plan of contrOl, under centralized authority, is imperative
to minimize that disaster.
The rna nifest advantages that will accrue to all
commQ~ities throughout California j~d other parts of the
Pacific Southwest by providing adequate protection against
earthquakes can be realized only by sacrifice on the
part of those now here.
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